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ABSTRACT
Any work that takes a thorough look at the problem of nationality requires a kind of common ground 
in the form of a consensus about such basic terms as people and nation. In the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire the main problem was the complexity of factors and the lack of unity, which also affected 
Austria’s special matter of nationality. Specifically, Austria witnessed the mutual opposition of three 
elements. Amidst the conflict of different ethnic groups and the historical kingdoms and provinces 
with the central power, ethnic groups made increasingly significant and radical demands as opposed 
to the other two groups. While this work also seeks to use consistent terms, it shifts the focus from 
the creation of unambiguous definitions to generally recognised historical development processes, 
such as the role of the slogans of popular sovereignty and equal rights in the definition of nation, and 
to trends in the scholarly interpretation of people and nation in the 19th century.
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From the birth of the modern concept of nation to the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, there was hardly any other historian or scholar of a different 
origin doing research into the problem of nationality who did not deal with the 
fundamental issues in some way, whether by creating more or less successful 
individual definitions of the existing terms or relying on previous attempts to define 
the phenomena of nation and nationality.
Nation and nationality are the products of social development so they can only be 
defined in the given geographic and chronological setting. In other words, one of the 
ways to define “nation” and “nationality” as used in the 19th century Habsburg Empire 
is to look at the theories of the two terms in that period.
The nation as the basic principle of organising social groups and states had become 
so dominant by the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries that it was the first to question 
the common imperial ideology in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and eventually 
exceeded it as a factor of state organisation. While scholars in the Austro-Hungarian 
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nation state clearly recognised2 the political “force” underlying the nation, which had 
become significant due to the evolutionary and revolutionary events that took place 
during the social, economic, and political processes since the 1789 French Revolution 
determined “nation” as an unquestionable basic principle, the proposed theoretical 
solutions were unable to exert sufficient pressure on the Empire’s political practices. 
In late 1917, Karl Renner described the interpretation of nation as used since the 
French Revolution as follows:
“It is the nation and only the nation that has the right and power to act upon 
its own initiative. It is not subject to any power, whether sacred or secular. And 
whatever is under the nation only has force by the nation’s authority and tolerance.”3 
Here Renner is talking about a “political” or active nation as opposed to the common 
meaning of the term until the late 18th century. Renner called this previous concept 
“civic nation”4 whose most salient feature is its passive nature.5
This paper is not concerned with the reasons why the nation had not become 
a relevant basic principle during human cohabitation before the 19th century but 
it offers a  brief overview of the models regarding the emergence of nation and 
national consciousness.6 In view of its historical origin, the organic and continuous 
development of the concept of nation was primarily spelt out by Leopold von Ranke. 
He and his followers look at the nation as one in a state of development that does not 
break away from older forms of organisation in any way. Another model postulates the 
nation as a supra-historical category that is independent from historical development.
The last group includes historians who regard the nation and national 
consciousness as an absolute novelty since the late 18th century. As with most models 
of thinking, we should take care when applying any of the three models to historical 
reality. The approach to the problem of nationality was more structured in the old 
Austria than what the above schemes offer.
The meaning of the term nation had not become politically relevant until the 19th 
century although national ideas had been promoted by the Illumination. Just why 
the concept played a key role in the 19th century is something caused by economic 
and social reforms. In the economy, for instance, the political changes were brought 
about by the disappearance of home economies, the emergence of major production 
units, and the existing economic conditions. The birth of new ideas, such as popular 
sovereignty and the equal rights of citizens, had created the image of a common 
nation in the French Revolution, where the term nation was used to mean a political 
community created by volonté générale (J. J. Rousseau, E. Renan).
2 Vö. Wenzel Frind, Das sprachliche und sprachlich-nationale Recht in polygotten Staaten und 
Ländern mit besonderer Rücksichtnahme auf Oesterreich und Böhmen (Wien 1899), 3 f.
3 Karl Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf 
Oesterreich. Teil I: Nation und Staat (Leipzig und Wien 1918), 9 f.
4 U.o., 8 f.
5 V.ö. Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, In: Friedrich Meinecke, 
Werke. Bd 4, hgg. Und eingeleitet von Hans Herzfield (München 1962), 15 f.
6 Vö. Moritz Csáky, Nation und Nationalstaat. Gedanken zur Genese des neuheitlichen 




At that time, the feeling of national unity could only rise after estate society 
collapsed. In Europe, the newly arisen, politically motivated national feeling gained 
strength and developed further under the influence of two factors. One was the 
Napoleonic wars, which touched off national resistance in the affected territories. 
The other was related to cultural history, the period of romanticism, which made 
German speaking cultures the first ones to look at the terms nation and people. Herder, 
the father of German language explanations that had national values, created all 
conditions for what would become irrational nationalism by defining people in terms 
of cultural and biological characteristics.
Central and Eastern Europe’s romantic term of nation and the predominance of 
German literature on the notions of people and nation rest on two pillars. Firstly, the 
outstanding significance of romanticism, which captivated people and still ensures 
the primacy of this period in German intellectual history. Secondly, ethnic-national 
groups in the first half of the 19th century exceeded the limits of small states that 
would merge to become a major political unit.
As opposed to the situation in Western European states, the lack of political 
agreement in national terms led to the “use of the German language” recognised 
throughout the 19th century, where nation referred to common origin and hence 
common ethnic origin and the consequent ethnic and cultural relationship. The term 
also included tribal affiliation whereas people meant ‘political union’. As opposed to 
this Eastern and Central European theory, in the areas where a cultural union arose 
based on a political alliance,7 i.e. in the English speaking world and partly in Romania, 
a uniform theory of political and cultural alliance was created. Both were designated 
by the term nation. In this Western theory, the term nation meant affiliation to 
a political union, citizenship,8 which prevented the registration of any nationality in 
official censuses from becoming a political matter in national conflicts. On this view, 
the term nation meant people of the same citizenship and thereby created a definition 
that did not offer any solution to the Austro-Hungarian nation state.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire’s common imperial ideology was unable to enforce 
the concept of nation that would have logically been in the state’s interest against the 
particular interests of individual ethnic groups and historical nations:
“Wir können immerhin diese Empiree als Einheitstaat declarieren können, ihr 
eine Verfassung geben, welche im Punkte der Centralisation sogar die französische 
noch hinter sich zurücklässt, können ihr Gebiet mit Winkelhaken und Lineal in 
correcte Quadrate theilen, oder ihre einzelnen Länder nach den verschiedenen 
Nationalitäten zerstückeln. Zuall’ dem braucht man sogar verhältnissmässig wenig 
Zeit. Aber den Begriff, welchem 35 Millionen Menschen mit dem Worte Vaterland 
verbinden, diesen Begriff, so irrig oder veraltet er auch sein möge, vermag keine 
Macht und kein Raisonnement plötzlich umzuändern, und dieser Begriff  ist, 
vielleicht das einzige Erzherzogthum Oesterreichs ausgenommen, nicht mit dem 
7 Rudolf Hermann v Herrnritt, Nationalität und Recht dargestellt nach der österreichischen 
und ausländischen Gesetzgebung (Wien 1899), 16 f.
8 Renner, Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 12 f.
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gesammten Reiche, sondern mit der einzelnen Provinz verknüpft.”9 (Nevertheless, 
we may declare this monarchy as a united state and may give it a constitution which 
surpasses even the French Constitution in terms of centralisation, and we may use 
a sextant and a ruler to divide it into exact squares or break up its provinces according 
to the different nationalities. Indeed, we need relatively little time for that. But the 
concept that 35 million people relate to the term homeland, whether erroneously or 
archaically, cannot be altered by either power or reasoning all of a sudden, and it is 
not related to the overall empire but only to its individual provinces, maybe except 
for the only archduchy of Austria.)
In the debate on nationality statistics at the London Congress of Statistics, 
the French delegate Legoyt firmly rejected the registration of nationalities on the 
grounds that he only knew a single nationality in France.10
The Congress of Statistics looked at the methodological questions of demographic 
statistics in London as had its previous editions both in Brussels (1853) and in 
Vienna (1857). All efforts to define the terms nation and people and most opinions in 
scholarship and the press on the matter gave rise to a methodological debate in this 
period while the essence of the question of nationality was pushed to the background.
At that time, people found that national movements aimed to acquire political 
power and exercise political rule.11
The desire for national equality included efforts to gain supremacy over national 
minorities as national feelings were primarily based on the belief in “eigene Größe” 
(individual greatness) as explained by Gustav Rümlein in his 1872 “Rede über den 
Begriff des Volkes” in interpreting the term people:
“Am liebsten würden wir den Schmuck dieses Namens ganz jenen Gruppen der 
Menschheit vorbehalten, welche eine eigenthümliche Anlage an Geist und Gemüth 
in festen und bleibenden Formen auszuprägen vermochten…”12 (We would prefer to 
reserve the glitter of this word only for groups of humanity that are able to express 
their special intellectual and spiritual endowments in a fixed and lasting form…).
This idea was recognised and analysed as early as 1851 by the Hungarian politician 
and statesman Baron József Eötvös: “Die Grundlage aller nationellen Bestrebungen ist 
das Gefühl höherer Begabung, ihr Zweck ist die Herrschaft.”13 (The foundation of all 
national efforts is the feeling of an outstanding ability and its goal is to rule.)
Eötvös not only expressed the principle of individual superiority as the basic 
principle of nationalism, an excessively one-sided interpretation according to 
19th century scholarship, but also went as far as to make a claim so far rejected in 
the Austrian Republic, namely that the adoption of the majority principle based 
on demographic statistics cannot be applied in matters of nationality. At the same 
time, the debates between nationalities could not have systematically been solved 
9 Joseph von Eötvös, Die Nationalitätenfrage. Überetzt von Max Falk (Pest 1865), 129 f.
10 Fr. J. Neumann, Volk und Nation S. (Leipzig 1888), 131 f.
11 Vö. Renner, Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 7 f.
12 Gustav Rümlein, Reden und Aufsätze Bd. I. (Freiburg i./b. und Tübingen 1875), 91 f.





amidst the nationality conflicts in Austria without explicit precautionary measures 
to defend minorities speaking other languages because Eötvös primarily considered 
the essence of the national principle as “the attempt to obtain power”.
In fact, what prevented the solution for the problems of Austria’s legal and social 
systems was the dynamics of the issue of nationalities.
So far no mention has been made of the terminological difficulties faced by all 
branches of science that came into contact with the terms of nation and people in the 
early 19th century. The fact that the issue of nationalities gained political strength 
in the 19th century brought about the need for uniform scholarly terminologies. 
The process of seeking a consensus over the issue has not finished to date but some 
fundamental works of ethnography, statistics, sociology, and law already used 
universally accepted terms in the latter half of the 19th century.
Previous authors such as Fichte, Mohl, and Ahrens had not made any distinction 
between nation and people. The use of these terms was only differentiated from the 
mid-19th century. One way of doing this was to conceive the nation as a political entity 
and to postulate it as a natural entity. On this view, people became part of the nation’s 
status as a state and political entity:
“…; es ist die Institution des Staats, in welcher ein einheitlicher, ordnender, 
intelligenter Wille der Kräfte, Anlagen und Richtungen eines Volkes zur realen 
äußeren Gestaltung bringt, und das Volk zu einem beseelten, persönlichen Wesen 
wird.”14 (… the institution of the state where a uniform, arranging, and intelligent 
will gives a realistic external form of appearance to a people’s force, abilities, and 
orientations to make such people a lively, personal being.)
This theory, which views the nation as a state unit, has the same consequence 
for the concept of nationality as Western approaches to nationality. In other words, 
both theories resulted in the coincidence of citizenship and nationality. As the actual 
conditions did not allow for such final conclusion for the region of Eastern and 
Central Europe, Eötvös already used the terms in his “Über die Gleichberechtigung 
der Nationalitäten in Österreich” (About the equal rights of nationalities in Austria) 
that most terminologists recognised as a  basic principle and later even justified 
theoretically.15
By contrast, the term people meant a political entity as described by Fr. J. Neumann 
in his “Volk und Nation”: “Und in dieser Beziehung ist Volk heute erstens der 
spezifische, unter allen Umständen zulässige Ausdruck für “politische Einheit”, 
besser gesagt: für die Gesamtheit der Angehörigen des Staats.”16 (In this respect, people 
is today primarily a specific term that can be accepted under any circumstances to 
denote “political union”, in other words: all citizens.)
The term nation was reduced to common origin (cf. the Latin word nasci) and the 
consequent ethnic and cultural relations, in view of historical development.
As opposed to other terminological issues, the difference between nation 
and nationality was defined in a  way as to meet scientific criteria. “Nation und 
14 Gustav Rümlein, Reden und Aufsätze Bd. I. (Freiburg und Tübingen), 108 f.
15 Heintritt, Nationalität und Recht, 16 f.
16 Neumann, Volk und Nation, 32 f.
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Nationalität bezeichnen eine Gruppe von Menschen, welche unter sich eine gewisse 
Gemeinsamkeit haben und eben durch diese Gemeinsamkeit, die wir gleichfalls 
“Nationalität” nennen, von anderen Menschengruppen sich unterscheiden.”17 (Nation 
and nationality denote a group of people who have a set of common features and differ 
from other people precisely for these common features, which we call “nationality”.)
Therefore, nationality has two meanings.18 Firstly, it refers to a specific group 
of  population as a  rival term of  nation and tribe. Secondly, it designates the 
collective status of a group or, as proposed by Herrnritt, “abstracte Eigenschaft des 
Volksstammes” (a tribe’s abstract characteristic).19
Neumann’s definition seeks to describe the features of “Volksstamm” (tribe) as 
used in jurisdiction and public administration but primarily in Article 19 of the 
Fundamental Law of 21 December 1867: “… eine kleinere Bevölkerungsgruppe, die 
infolge der Gemeinsamkeit äusserer Lebensbedingungen und eigenartiger Kultur-
anfänge ein eigenartiges gemeinsames Wesen gewonnen hat, das sich von Gene-
ration zu Generation überträgt und sich vorzugsweise in gemeinsamer Mundart, 
gemeinsamen Charakterzügen, gemeinsamen Sitten und Gebräuchen und in dem 
Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit zu äussern pflegt.”20 (… a  minor group of the 
population having a peculiar common essence due to the coincidence of its external 
living conditions and unique cultural background, passed down from generation to 
generation, and is most manifest in a common spoken dialect, features, habits and 
traditions, and the feeling of shared identity.)
Neumann is talking about the features that determine a  tribe’s existence by 
listing even the subjective and objective elements of the definition of nation and 
nationality in the very first meaning of tribe. In this way, he highlighted the essence 
of statements that are relevant for nationality statistics. However, the term nation 
was defined, the main issue was to interpret the criterion that the existing forms of 
organisation allowed for. In other words, the refusal to identify nation with citizenship 
gave rise to the problem that must underlie all further final conclusions in writings 
about research into language use beyond the river Leitha: Which features determine 
a nationality?
The criteria of nationality not only underlay nationality statistics but were also 
vital for theoretical proposals. As these issues are detailed in the chapter on the 
historical development of nationality statistics, here we only take a cursory look at 
the criteria of nationality.
The possible criteria included common origin, race, residence, historical and 
cultural background, religion, and language. Meanwhile, language did not enjoy 
the supremacy at all that was accorded to it in 19th century ideology without making 
a clear distinction between language and nation. The two terms often overlapped 
17 Uo., 8 f.
18 Gerald Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten und die österreichische De-
zember-Verfassung von 1867. Sonderabdruck aus: Der österreichisch-ungarische Aus-
gleich von 1867, (Wien/München 1967), 191 f.
19 Heintritt, Nationalität und Recht, 17 f.




because the national self-evaluation of  individual tribes was primarily based 
on language. Scholars had the opinion that language was the primary form of 
expression of  national consciousness although the smallest and linguistically 
isolated groups sometimes had to adopt this theory of  legitimacy to achieve 
national group egoism in addition to linguistic autonomy despite their low level 
of education and culture. Scholars overestimated the values of common language 
in that they misjudged, under the influence of nationalist trends, the link between 
the “Spracheupforie” (language euphoria) of  the period and the really complex 
components of nationality.21 
“Die Gemeinschaft der Sprache ist also, wie die gewöhnliche Meinung mit Recht 
annimmt, das zuverlässigste Merkmal nationaler Gemeinschaft.” (Thus, a language 
community is, as rightly supposed by the public opinion, the most reliable criterion 
of national community.)
Both scholars and the “gewöhnliche Meinung” (public opinion) accepted what 
they had experienced in reality and converted the language nation, which had 
to achieve a  specific goal in the situation of national groups of different levels 
of development and in the ideologies of Austria’s individual nationalisms, into 
a principle that reduced the conflict between nationalities to a matter of language 
even though national movements used language quite consciously to enforce their 
national interests.
As the latter conflicts become visible through different languages, they are 
embodied in the struggle for language, i.e. its use in public life and its equal rights. 
However, this form is not the essence of the struggle. The essence cannot be other 
than the essence of all social struggles, i.e. the struggle for power.
Gumplowicz’s opinion is clearly marked by socio-Darwinist features and is 
thereby the same as the national ideas of the majority of the contemporaries quoted 
above.
Also, language was clearly overemphasised in the decision of the International 
Statistics Congress to introduce “Nationalitätenstatistik” (nationality statistics) and 
hence in the incorporation of a box for languages in the census forms. According to 
the official statements, the nationalities of Austria did not form part of the language 
census after 1880. Indeed, there were national conflicts as some part of the population 
believed that the financial status of certain nationalities mattered more than the 
category of their language. This generated an incongruence as census takers and some 
respondents tried to state language as a means of communication in the census while 
others, motivated by the teachings of socio-Darwinism, considered the principle of 
language as essentially the expression of the struggle for national supremacy and 
wanted to make this a norm in censuses.
Coming back to the criteria of nationalities, which are relevant not for nationality 
statistics but primarily for nationality rights, we have to point out a trend that gave 
rise to another shift of focus in the definition of nationality around the collapse of the 
Empire, specifically the popularisation of national ideas and hence the increasing 
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intensity of the feeling of oneness. In addition to the already defined “objective” 
features, under the influence of the national development of certain tribes, the 
term nationality increasingly came to include “subjective” features, such as the 
typical national consciousness, the feeling of oneness, and the individual’s national 
allegiance based on their free determination.22
This overview of theories about the definition of nationality has revealed the 
following basic attitudes. The two extremes in the interpretation of nationality, i.e. 
the one-sidedly subjective or objective approach, do not exclude each other a priori 
but an attempt was made at the general perception of both methods.23
Basically, there was always an interplay of several factors but no theoretical 
consensus was reached as to the composition and number of the required factors. As 
suggested by Renner, Herrnritt and Bernatzik, the scholars who dealt the most with 
the theoretical foundations of the issue of nation, in the last decades of the Empire, 
in scholarly theory, the so-called “Bekenntnisprinzip” (allegiance based on individual 
declaration) was increasingly significant but this did not change nationality survey 
methods.
In summary of all scholarly opinions expressed in response to the terminological 
problems about nationality until the collapse of the Empire, also in consideration of 
the wide array of proposed solutions, it is fair to say that nation, just like nationality 
and tribe, treated as synonyms, was defined as a social group by scholars in the period, 
a group that had emerged under the influence of different objective and subjective 
features with different effects, and that represented an attempt at absolute political 
power against the other principles of human coexistence.
Nationality as a social and political basic principle appeared in Europe already 
in the early 19th century. At the same time, it became clear that a period determined 
by legal uncertainty must elapse between the emergence and the actual relevance of 
a phenomenon and between its legal appearance.
Such time difference between appearance in practice and statutory regulation 
was typical of nationalities in the life of the Austro-Hungarian Empire up until the 
Constitution of December 1867 in the areas west of the Leitha. While nationality as 
a political term existed already in the first half of the century, the Austrian legislators 
did not know the exact definition of nationality until the end of the Empire and used 
the term tribe in its place.
The process of laying down the basic principle of nation in the laws, which 
essentially differed from the mere recognition of national terms, already started 
in the drafts of the 1849 Kremsier Constitution and went on until the registration 
of national elections based on the principle of personality in Moravia (1905) and 
Bukovina (1910).24
22 This makes the literature include the “subjective” elements in the term Bekenntnisprinzip.
23 Vö. Wolfgang Steinacker, Der Begriff der Volkszugehörigkeit und die Praxis der Volkszu-
gehörigkeitsbestimmung im altösterreichischen Nationalitätenrecht (=Schriften des In-
stituts für Sozialforschung in den Alpenländern an der Universität Innsbruck IX. Folge, 
Innsbruck 1932).




What was the intention of legislators in defining tribe and nationality, the latter in 
the sense of a social group’s characteristic, also for the group itself, and why did they 
institutionalise it later?
The idea of a nation’s proportionate representation, which greatly exceeded the 
purely linguistic demands of the individual nationalities (the use of official and 
school language), despite the predictable consequence of the protracted nationality 
debates, became a demand of national representations.25
The individual not only demanded increasing recognition of their own language 
in the educational system and official matters but also had to confront with the 
representatives of  their own nationality. The intended institutionalisation of 
national relations took shape as a right as early as 1873 in the linguistically diverse 
areas of Bohemia, initially only at a school level, provincial legislation, and in the 
establishment of the national “sections” of certain school boards.
The principle of “national autonomy” was surpassed by the previous principle 
of “command of language” to such extent that nationality law entered into a new 
stage of development where individual national autonomy became a necessary basic 
principle of political organisations. As has been mentioned, the first such law was 
the “Schulaufsichtgesetz für Böhmen” (School Supervision Act for Bohemia) dated 
24 February 1873 (LGB1. 17), which ordered the appointment of a local school board 
for both the German and the Czech nationalities in places where schools existed 
for both nationalities unless the principle of territoriality, i.e. local demarcation 
applied. The village or city representatives were allowed or “required” to elect the 
local representatives for both school boards, “Wie auch der Ortsschulinspektor den 
Angehörigen jener Nationaität entnommen werden, für welche die Schule, die der 
Ortsschulrat vertritt, bestimmt ist.” (As the school inspector must also be of the same 
nationality for which the school was designated and which is represented by the local 
school board).26
In the decades after the first such law was passed, the areas of Bohemia and 
Moravia which, as a result of the polarisation of national forces, were engaged in the 
most fierce debate over nationalities increasingly used the opportunity to establish 
“national sections” in the areas of school, agriculture, and medical chambers during 
legislative or other official regulations.27
Eventually, Silesia established a National Cultural Council with three national 
sections in 1910. Tirol enjoyed a  privileged situation as in 1881 it introduced the 
principle of differentiated sections in agriculture following the national criterion 
but implemented the separation of the German and Italian sections, based on the 
natural geographic separation of the two nationalities, by means of a geographic 
adscription.28
Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia found the exact geographic demarcation of 
the national zones problematic as the only possible basis for the above laws was 
25 Ebenda.
26 Zitiert in: Bernatzik, Das österreichische Natinalitätenrecht, 990 f.
27 Bernatzik, Nationalitätenrecht, 989–1007 ff.
28 Storzh, Probleme der Nationalitätenrechts, 143 f.
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the individual perspective of affiliation to a nationality. Thus, national affiliation 
determined the state’s legal relations and the Supreme Court expressed this in its 
decisions. Logically, this meant that „the geographic principle thus far valid in public 
law partially replaced the personal principle”.29
This principle could only be enforced by the individual survey of the population’s 
national affiliation. Added to this was the basic dilemma of the legal aspect of the 
nationality conflict and thereby the problem of personal presence in bodies of 
nationality representatives.
The laws based on the principle of nationality gave rise to rules that lacked 
the legal basis required for their enforcement. This fact, untenable for legislation 
and public administration, was the primary argument for the opponents of the 
language use survey conducted during the censuses for replacing the term spoken 
language in everyday communication with directly inquiring about nationality. Most 
nationalities actually rejected the possibility of assimilation in the language they 
used, which was apparently incompatible with the national aspiration of the groups 
concerned.
After 1880 at the provincial assemblies and in the central parliament, the 
Government was regularly proposed, especially by the Czech part, ways to survey the 
language use of nationalities, which the authorities did not recognise as the statistical 
survey of nationalities if the affiliation to the given nationality in the heterogeneous 
Austria and Hungary referred to the entire state organisation. The government was 
aware of that dilemma and, in deviation from the principle of counting, preferred to 
move towards a subjective nationality survey, as shown by the 1900 and 1910 censuses.
The nationalities that did not profit from the language use surveys due to their 
economic or social situation felt concerned that the government would ultimately 
consider the results of such surveys as a basic principle in regulating the issues of 
nationality.
Despite the function of the language use surveys as a  “national indicator” 
challenged by the government, Heinrich Mayrhofer von Grünbühel, who moderately 
supported the government’s census policy and whose writing “Die Volkszählung 
in Österreich” was used by the Graz Governorship as an instruction material for 
preparing the census committees for the 1900 census, wrote the following:
“…. Die Sprachenerhebung der Volkszählungen wird in der Praxis des gesamm-
ten öffentlichen Lebens immer und überall als der Schlüssel für die Entzifferung der 
Gruppierung der Nationalitäten angesehen. (…the language use survey of censuses 
was considered always and everywhere as the key to solve the grouping of nationa-
lities in official affairs.)30
The government’s theoretical idea that the results of the language surveys did 
not reflect exact nationality data but allowed for conclusions as to national relations 
became embodied in the concern of the Slavic national groups as they were afraid 
that the survey results would reflect in the texts of nationality bills, relevant for the 
nationality conflict.
29 Edmund Bernatzik, Über nationale Matriken (Wien 1910), 17 f.




The ministerial decree issued on 24 February 1898 during the term of Prime 
Minister Gautsch, which referred to the official use of languages in the Kingdom 
of Bohemia, supports that the concerns were well-grounded in that the figures of 
the censuses were used for creating regulations on languages and nationalities. The 
language decree regulated the criterion of a mixed district in Section 7, which only 
recognised the language minority’s rights if, according to the results of the latest 
census, at least one-fourth of the locality’s participating population had chosen the 
other language used inside the country. The use of the two nationwide languages 
in public administration was based on the designation of the linguistically mixed 
districts.
In addition, on the one hand, the principle that made minority rights dependent 
on the minimum percentage came to the foreground, as this was subject to a debate 
in all drafts about the regulation of language use in the autonomous offices. On the 
other hand, it was recognised that the common language used by the participating 
population was important and affected the language used in the given public agency.31
However, it was not legally laid down that the census figures were the only 
evidence of the population’s distribution in percentages.32
In 1910 Wladimir von Pražák tried to solve the contradiction between the 
necessary determination of  the exact nationality figures and the refusal of  the 
unreal language use surveys for various reasons by replacing the language use 
survey with the direct survey of the mother tongue of the nationality or something 
close to it. The same attempt was made by many Members of Parliament in their 
interpellations and filings since the introduction of  the language use survey. 
Pražák, who attended the meetings of  the Central Statistical Committee in 1910 
as the representative of  the Ministry of  Agriculture and contributed to the 
preparation of the census of 31 December 1910, was the only participant to claim 
that the surveys should not cover the inquiry about everyday language use. He did 
so with reference to the national laws made for Bohemia and Moravia, following the 
principle of national autonomy, that do not rely on the language spoken in everyday 
life but demanded the individual survey of nationalities according to the valid legal 
interpretation of nationalities.
As no law laid down the term of nationality, the representatives of the given 
nationalities were able to adapt a certain criterion to the individual situations when 
specifying the term nationality to be defined as a non-absolute statistical magnitude.
Eventually, this conclusion only applies to the necessary criteria of nationality 
but does not at all affect another key question if the nationality must be registered 
within the census.
The practices of Austrian courts do not include any single case where the Supreme 
and Administrative Courts or the Constitutional Court decided on affiliation to the 
given nationality based on a declaration made in the language use survey. Despite the 
declaration of using the given language, it was impossible to identify nationality in 
the individual decisions. In the case of a clear statutory background it is impossible 
31 Wenzel Frind, Das sprachliche und sprachlich-nationale Recht (Wien 1899), 302 f.
32 Bernatzik, Über nationale Matriken, 13 f.
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that the legislative bodies west of the Leitha ever considered the factor of language 
use, de jure, as a criterion which constituted the very nationality.
Mention must be made of the political value of language use surveys whereas 
spoken language was in this case, quite correctly, de facto identified with the concept 
of nationality.
Article 19 of Fundamental Law No. 142 of 21 December 1867, the significance of 
which cannot be overestimated in the problem of early Austrian nationality, was 
the potential basis, together with Section 1 on the equal rights of all tribes, for the 
demand for the establishment of national relations. Yet, the detractors of language 
use surveys argued against the direct application of or need for the provisions aimed 
at Article 19 and its implementation. The explanations provided in this respect had 
the starting point, on the one hand, that the entire Article 19 was enshrined in a law 
that spells out the general rights of citizens while the article establishes the tribe’s 
right (i.e. a collective right) as it was worded33, on the other hand the fact that the 
problem of collective versus individual rights was decided by court practices and the 
related question whether it was about a promising law or only a directly applicable 
right. The consequent legal uncertainty frustrated the demand for the right to assume 
nationality as a corollary of Article 19 of Fundamental Law No. 142. Thus, in this field, 
the arguments against the use of a common language were limited to their alleged 
administrative effects, which were not in harmony with the text of the census 
prescriptions and Austria’s nationality law at that time.
As neither the Austrian courts nor parliament regulated national law only based on 
census results in any single case, the frequent argument about the misinterpretation 
of statistical data came to have an instrumental character. Schematically, language 
use statistics was replaced by an inquiry into national allegiance as one of the 
methods of self-justification:
“Österreich wird von zahlreichen Nationalitäten bewohnt und daher sind die Er-
hebungen über die Nationalität von größeren Wichtigkeit für die staatlichen Funk-
tionen sowie auch für das Zusammenleben der Nationen. In den bisherigen Volks-
zählungen sind jedoch nur die Rubriken der „Umgangssprache”, nicht aber die der 
Nationalität angeben, was zur Folge hat, daß die Wissenschaft darunter leidet und der 
politische Organismus mangelhaft und ungenau funktioniert.” (Austria is inhabited 
by a number of nationalities so the surveys about nationalities have the greatest 
relevance for the state’s operation and the coexistence of nations. At the same time, 
the censuses so far have only included the box for “language used in everyday life” 
but not one for nationality, with the consequence that science is frustrated and the 
political regime works deficiently and inaccurately.)34
Such deficient and inaccurate operation of the political regime was based on the 
fact in the issue of nationalities that Austrian law did not know the individual term of 
nationality35 so in all decisions of the supreme public agencies where the precondition 
33 Karl Gottfried Hugelmann, Das Nationalitätenrecht nach der Verfassung von 1867 (Wien/
Leipzig 1934), 89 f.
34 Uo., 93 f.




was the individual assumption of national separation or national allegiance, the court 
had to establish the factors that determined nationality. Disregarding the fact that as 
long as the matter of national affiliation was not legally regulated as a special target, 
excluding individual cases, the proclamation of national rights in any form, primarily 
in German speaking areas, led to the escalation of the national conflict36, legislation 
had the duty, which the supreme public agencies were required to perform. This 
means that courts as supreme legal authorities in theoretical terms exceeded their 
power in the rule of law.
Bernatzik strongly criticised the definition of nationality that exceeded court 
competence and was at times different and argued against courts’ power to define 
the criteria of nationality.
The reason for this legally difficult situation is that data about the languages 
spoken in everyday life, a survey incorporated into the censuses since 1880, were not 
considered as nationality statistics. The deficient methods of the survey of languages 
spoken in everyday life and the fact that census results did not provide a “clear” 
picture, either de iure or de facto, of the national affiliations of the individual citizens 
led to attempts to provide a more solid basis for national affiliation.37
The Administrative Court, established in 1876, and the Supreme Court, established 
in 1869 in the Austrian part of the Empire as a guarantee for constitutional rights, 
in complete opposition to the situation of Hungary, a multinational nation state38, 
continuously confronted with issues of nationality and the Supreme Court asked the 
Central Statistical Committee for statistical data as grounds for a judgement already in 
1879 to tackle such issues. At its session on 18 October 1879, in response to the Supreme 
Court’s request for data related to the national division of the population of Lemberg, 
the agency made the point that the Central Statistical Committee did not have data 
on the national division of the population as no nationality censuses had taken 
place in Austria. The Central Committee emphasised the importance of surveying 
“Familiensprache” (the language used in family), as also proposed by Adolph Ficker, 
the period’s leading statistician. After the Austrian government decided in March 
1880, for reasons that are examined elsewhere, to not inquire about nationality in the 
censuses but about the languages spoken in the families, this did not mean a criterion 
of national affiliation either for the Supreme Court or for the Administrative Court.
The theoretically objective question of statistics became a means of the national 
struggle in that the answer to the question confronted people with its political 
significance;39 so it remained the duty of law to achieve a  legal interpretation of 
nationalities irrespectively of census results, which could not provide a basis for the 
population’s national division and personal affiliations as the products of the national 
struggle and as the expression of the national force of the individual nationalities.
Essentially the same methodological question arises for both nationality law 
and statistics. Neither the legal practices of supreme authorities nor statistics could 
36 Herrnritt, Nationalität und Recht, 82 f.
37 Wolfgang, Steinacker, Volkszugehörigkeit im Nationalitätenrecht (Innsbruck 1932), 62 f.
38 Stourzh, Probleme des Natinalitätenrechts, 133 ff.
39 Bernatzik, Über nationale Matriken, 10 f.  
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reach a constant “modus vivendi” that can be followed in every case. Theoretically, 
both subjective and objective elements were used to determine nationalities. Once 
a set of criteria were identified for examining the individual’s nationality (by lack of 
statutory provisions), it remained the duty of legislators, as proposed by Steinacker, 
to choose between “Wesensmerkmale” (objective criteria) and “Willensmerkmale” 
(subjective criteria).40 The legal practices of courts were hovering between the two 
extremes. The principle of national self-declaration, focussed on the individual’s 
decision, was applied the same way as the option to make the objectivation of actions 
(“Objektivierungen der Handlungen”) which give shape to the national sense, 
a criterion of national differentiation.41
In the latter case, where a public agency determined nationality, the census data 
were also used as an objectivation of the national sense. Curiously, the decisions taken 
by the supreme authorities and the trends underlying the definition of language 
spoken in everyday life moved towards the opposite direction in the last decades of 
the Empire.
Let us take a  look at the relation between language and nationality from the 
perspective of positive law. As reflected by the decisions of the supreme authorities, 
language, whichever its form, was never considered the same as nationality. At the 
same time, language was one of the criteria of enforcing national rights based on 
“Landesüblichkeit” (any element used and usual in, and typical of, the given country 
or province, such as the language spoken by the nationalities living in the given 
province).42
After 1867, the postulate of national equal rights affected two distinct areas: the 
field of language rights on the one hand and the right to national affiliation and 
national autonomy.43
The matter of equal rights for tribes was settled by legal means in Bohemia and 
Bukovina only at the beginning of the century based on the principle of national 
autonomy whereas the typical discrepancy of legal practices in the other crown 
provinces between the necessary “Landesüblichkeit” of  the language and the 
determination of national affiliation meant that the issue of nationalities formally 
remained nothing but the issue of language.44
The enforcement of national rights in language was based on the determination 
whether a language was “landesüblich” (characteristic of or usual in the given country 
or province). This primarily relied on the data of language use surveys but certainly 
not in the consistent practice of the supreme authorities. In its order dated 12 July 
1880, the Supreme Court45 argued that a language may be declared “landesüblich”, 
40 Steinacker, Volkszugehörigkeit im Nationalitätenrecht, 40 f.
41 Vö. Gerald Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsgarantie. 
Erscheint in: Die Habsburgmonarchie 1848–1918. Hgg. Von Adam Wandruszka und Peter 
Urbanitsch Bd. 3 (Wien 1979).
42 Bernatzik, Das österreichische Nationalitätenrecht, 978 f.
43 Uo., 981 f.
44 Bernatzik, Das österreichische Nationalitätenrecht, 978 f.




i.e. spoken and otherwise used in the given country or province, if it is spoken by a high 
number of local people “in everyday communication” (even if only in certain regions 
or places of the country, i.e. if it is definitely used in the given country or province).
The term “landesüblich” required a certain degree of stability in language use 
whereas this was also determined using different census results for a comparison. The 
linguistic and nationality problems of Austria’s public administration in the period 
concerned the “external” and “internal” official language and the language training of 
government officials. The interests of certain social groups were confronted in military 
language use and education, and in the central issue of the language of education.
The registration of the language used for everyday communication also played 
a role in choosing a language for drafting official statements in certain locations. In 
its decision dated 10 June 1905, the Administrative Court held that official statements 
must be written in the country’s autochthonous language “that people in the place 
(chosen for the event of election) feel their own”.46
Language use surveys also played a key role in making decisions on linguistic 
matters of traffic regulations. The lack of individual laws in railway and post 
administration that regulated multilingualism meant that the term Landesüblichkeit 
and together with it census results were used.47 In post administration, the agencies 
relied on the results of the latest language use surveys concerning matters of official 
language. Also, these data were used by the Central Statistical Office in the language 
formulation of its publication Allgemeine Ortschaftsverzeichnisse vom Jahre 1900 
(General Place Register of the 1900s).
Official language and the language of school education meant the two collision 
points of the linguistic-national conflict where people demanded the settlement of 
language relations. In 1880 the survey of language used in public life was introduced 
to answer the question of nationalities’ distribution by number but not individual 
national affiliations and also to make the census data as a basis for regulating school 
and official language.
In mapping the percentage of nationalities, the language use results of the census 
were applied in several decrees on official language in certain crown provinces as the 
only way to support the linguistic distribution of the population. This should be laid 
down in a law according to the bill submitted by Koerbers in May 1900 to the Czech 
Language Act.48
The re-regulation of the division of Bohemia into districts was one of the 
most important matters also in 1910, in the debate on censuses that was about the 
nationality factor. The Czech side used the data of Bohemia’s 1910 language use survey 
to legitimise the fundamental refusal to the national definition of districts.
As neither the government nor the representatives of nationalities gave up their 
positions, altogether there was no consensus either in the use of census figures or in 
the matter pertaining to school and official language.
46 1905. 06. 10-i VGH-végzés Budw. 3630/A.
47 Vö. § 20 des Organisationsstatutes für die staatliche Eisenbahnverwaltung vom 19. 01. 1896, 
RGB1. Nr. 16.
48 Bernatzik, Über nationale Matriken, 13 f. 
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Yet, when summary census statistics were used, in diametric opposition to the 
legal basis accepted for the individual establishment of nationality, the language 
spoken in everyday life was used to draw a conclusion as to nationality. In a few cases 
also minorities of a limited number were taken into consideration. At the same time, 
the court recognised few language minorities in the compromise solution between 
the Czech proposal of bilingual equal rights and the German proposal of monolingual 
equal rights and considered the language spoken by minorities as used in the province 
(landesüblich) in the referendum.49
Summarising all aspects of the principle of spoken language and the principle of 
national affiliation, the link between language and nationality not to be determined 
meant that, as expressed figuratively by Renner, language eventually served 
as a  “Gesslerhut” (Gessler hat),50 which was also affected by the significance of 
international conflicts.
“Der Kampf um die Sprache erhitzt die Gemüter vor allem deshalb, weil hin-
ter dem meist formalen Streit um das gesprochene und geschriebene Wort sich 
der Kampf der Nation um die Macht im Staate oder über den Staat verbirgt.” (The 
struggle for language has stirred up such a controversy mainly because underlying 
the debate, mostly formal, about written or spoken language is the struggle of nations 
for power in or over the state.)51
Such struggle for power, which took shape in the principle of nationality, can 
explain the discrepancy that arose during the debate over nationality and language. 
The only way to obtain language and national rights was for the language to be 
“landesüblich”, i.e. used in the given province, or for the individual to be a member of 
the given tribe, whether or not it lived in the area, or for the given tribe to inhabit the 
area, irrespectively of the person’s national affiliation.52 Yet, the recognition of such 
rights by the supreme authorities not only depended on the language factor by lack 
of the relevant law. The individual could demand language rights on the grounds of 
nationality but language was not recognised as a decisive component of the definition 
of nationality.
49 Vö. VGH-Erkenntnis vom 1905. 03. 11. Budw. Nr. 3372/A; VGH-Erkenntnis vom 1909. 12. 16. 
Budw. Nr. 7081/A. und VGH-Erkenntnis vom 1914. 12. 09. Budw. Nr. 10624/A.
50 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 63 f.
51 Uo., 65 f.
52 Vö. Hernritt, Die Ausgestaltung des österreichischen Nationalitätenrechts, 588 f.
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